In recent years, scholars have documented the racial disparities of mass incarceration. In this paper we argue that, although retributivism and deterrence theory appear to be race-neutral, in the contemporary U.S. context these seemingly contrary theories function jointly to rationalize racial inequities in the criminal justice system. When people of color are culturally associated with criminality, they are perceived as both irresponsible and hyperresponsible, a paradox that reflects their status as what Charles Mills calls subpersons. Following from this paradox, criminality (...) is understood as an atemporal characteristic of people of color, such that they are conceived as pre-criminals, criminals, or post-criminals. In Frantz Fanon’s account, overdetermination expresses this exclusion of people of color from full agency by capturing them within a rigid, immutable essence, which then controls the social meaning of their actions. The backward-looking quality of retribution and the forward-looking quality of deterrence then treat people of color as more deserving of punishment (and more severe punishment) and as threats to the social order who have to be restrained. We should read the racialization of mass incarceration as a symptom of how precariously people of color participate in the social contract and as reflections of how theories of punishment have been racially deployed. (shrink)

Kantian defenders of suicide for the soon-to-be demented claim that killing oneself would protect rather than violate a person’s inherent worth. The loss of cognitive functions reduces someone to a lower moral status, so they believe that suicide is a way of preserving or preventing the loss of dignity. I argue that they misinterpret Kant’s examples and fail to appreciate the reasons behind his absolute prohibition on suicide. Although Kant says that one may have to sacrifice one’s life to fulfill (...) a moral duty, suicide is not morally equivalent to self-sacrifice because it involves treating oneself merely as a means. Furthermore, people facing the onset of dementia would not protect their dignity by killing themselves while they are still rational and would not avoid a demeaning existence. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: The Ancient Practice of Abortion, and Continuing Controversies Universalized Maxims Are Not Retroactive The Formula of Humanity: Appealing to Personhood Thomson and Boonin: The Personhood of the Fetus Does Not Matter The Elements of Personhood: Self‐Consciousness, Humanity, Responsibility An Attempt to Bring Fetuses into Kant's Moral Community: The Appeal to Kind Another Common Strategy: The Argument from Potential Do We Have Indirect Duties to Fetuses? No Fetuses, No Children The Need for a Pragmatic Concept of (...) Personhood The Specter of Infanticide Kant's Appeal to God Problematic Implications of the Appeal to Personhood Our Kantian Heritage: Trouble with Those at the Margins of Personhood. (shrink)

In addition to preparing students for graduate school or emphasizing transferable skills that are useful in any career, philosophy departments ought to give majors the education and work experience that will train them to become ethics officers outside of academia. This is a growing field that allows students to engage non-philosophers in setting corporate policies and addressing morally significant social issues. Using a course in medical ethics as an example, I show how incorporating service-learning into philosophy classes benefits students both (...) academically and professionally, and also demonstrates the value of philosophy to the community and to academic administrators. (shrink)

This Handbook provides a comprehensive survey of major topics in the philosophy of punishment from many of the field’s leading scholars. Key features Presents a history of punishment theory from ancient times to the present. Evaluates the main proposed justifications of punishment, including retributivism, general and specific deterrence theories, mixed theories, expressivism, societal-defense theory, fair play theory, rights forfeiture theory, and the public health-quarantine model. Discusses sentencing, proportionality, policing, prosecution, and the role punishment plays in the context of the state. (...) Examines advances in neuroscience and debates about whether free will skepticism undermines the justifiability of punishment. Considers forgiveness, restorative justice, and calls to abolish punishment. Addresses pressing social issues such as mass incarceration, juvenile justice, punitive torture, the death penalty, and “cruel and unusual” punishment. · With its unmatched breadth and depth, this book is essential reading for scholars who want to keep abreast of the field and for advanced students wishing to explore the frontiers of the subject. (shrink)

Anthropocentric biases manifest themselves in two different ways in research on animal cognition. Some researchers claim that only humans have the capacity for reasoning, beliefs, and interests; and others attribute mental concepts to nonhuman animals on the basis of behavioral evidence, and they conceive of animal cognition in more or less human terms. Both approaches overlook the fact that language-use deeply informs mental states, such that comparing human mental states to the mental states of nonlinguistic animals is misguided. In order (...) to avoid both pitfalls -- assuming that animals have mental lives just like we do, or assuming that they have no mental lives at all -- I argue for a functional methodological approach. Researchers should study animal cognition by identifying environmental inputs, the functional role of internal states, and behavioral outputs. Doing so will allow for cross-species comparisons in a way that the use of folk psychological terms does not. (shrink)

The publication of the critical edition of Reason in Science marks a moment of significant progress in The Works of George Santayana project of The MIT Press, a project nearing its thirtieth year. The book series from which RS is derived, The Life of Reason, is the most important philosophic work of Santayana's early career, and indeed is of essential importance for anyone interested in early twentieth-century American philosophy. As James Gouinlock puts it in his introduction, LR "proved to be (...) a major stimulus to the revitalization of philosophy in America, and its value continues today".RS is the final book of the five-part LR. The four volumes preceding RS, thematically covering "reason in"... (shrink)

This book provides a focus for future discussion in one of the most important debates within historical theology within the protestant tradition - the debate about the definition of a category of analysis that operates over five centuries of religious faith and practice and in a globalising religion. In March 2009, TIME magazine listed ‘the new Calvinism’ as being among the ‘ten ideas shaping the world.’ In response to this revitalisation of reformation thought, R. Scott Clark and D. G. Hart (...) have proposed a definition of ‘Reformed’ that excludes many of the theologians who have done most to promote this driver of global religious change. In this book, the Clark-Hart proposal becomes the focus of a debate. Matthew Bingham, Chris Caughey, and Crawford Gribben suggest a broader and more historically responsible definition for ‘Reformed,’ as Hart and Scott respond to their arguments. (shrink)

I argue that Sartre’s philosophy can be both broadened in its aspirations and deepened in its implications through dialogue with the life sciences. Section 1 introduces the philosophical terrain. Section 2 explores Sartre’s evolving understanding of nature and human relations with nature. Section 3 explores Sartre’s perspectives on scientific inquiry, natural history, and dialectical reason. Section 4 outlines recent developments in the life sciences that bear directly on Sartre’s quiet curiosity about a naturalistic dialectics. Section 5 suggests how these developments (...) constitute progress toward an “ecologized” dialectical philosophy consistent with Sartre’s mature ontology of praxis and pertinent to addressing the burgeoning socioecological crisis. (shrink)

Neurlolinguistic programming is a powerful technology for modelling aspects of human excellence so that others can achieve similar levels of effectiveness. This article describes how to teach a simple communication pattern called "pace and lead,” derived from studies of the hypnotic induction techniques of such master hypnotists as Milton Erickson. The "Pace and Lead" frame consists of several sensorily verifiable statements (pace) followed by a positive suggestion (lead). This pattern is the basis for virtually all communication which seeks to influence, (...) manipulate or heal and as such, constitutes a very useful skill with a wide variety of applications.This frame—simple in its outward form but profound in its potential extension to a variety of real world situations—deserves more general inclusion in the teaching of consciousness curriculum. Anthropologists with an interest in language and consciousness issues will appreciate the accessibility of the exercise and its ability to concretely embody abstract issues such as the role of language in the creation of personal and cultural "realities.”. (shrink)

A wealth of research in social psychology indicates that various ethically arbitrary situational factors exert a surprisingly powerful influence on moral conduct. Empirically-minded philosophers have argued over the last two decades that this evidence challenges Aristotelian virtue ethics. John Doris, Gilbert Harman, and Maria Merritt have argued that situationist moral psychology – as opposed to Aristotelian moral psychology – is better suited to the practical aim of helping agents act better. The Aristotelian account, with its emphasis on individual factors, invites (...) too much risk of morally bad conduct insofar as it ignores the power of situational factors which lead us astray. Moral agents are often better off detecting and intervening on situational factors to help themselves act better. This paper offers an argument against the claim that situationism enjoys practical advantages over Aristotelian virtue ethics. There is empirical evidence suggesting that people can improve their behavior via Aristotelian strategies of deliberate self-improvement. This evidence also suggests that focusing our ethical attention on morally trivial factors may result in worse overall conduct. Accordingly, Aristotelianism may fare better than situationism on the practical issue of moral improvement. (shrink)

The Fractured Self in Freud and German Philosophy examines Freud's transformation of German philosophical approaches to freedom, history, and self-knowledge; defends a theory of situated knowledge and agency; and considers the relevance of Freudian thought for contemporary cultural issues.

Abtract: This article argues that the debate between reductive and nonreductive physicalists is best characterized as a disagreement about which properties are natural. Among other things, natural properties are those that characterize the world completely. All physicalists accept the “completeness of physics,” but this claim contains a subtle ambiguity, which results in two conceptions of natural properties. Reductive physicalists should assert, while nonreductive physicalists should deny, that a single set of low-level physical properties is natural in both of these senses. (...) This way of drawing the distinction succeeds where previous approaches have failed and illuminates why the debate about reductionism is important. (shrink)

Distinguished scholars evaluate the contribution pragmatism can make to a viable naturalism, exploring what distinguishes pragmatic naturalism from other naturalisms. They examine pragmatism's distinctive form of nonreductive naturalism and consider its merits for the study of religion, democratic theory, and as a general philosophical orientation.

This programmatic essay sketches a few reasons for the elusive nature of conscious experience. It proposes that while neither introspection nor phenomenologically refined reflection delivers direct ‘observational’ access to intrinsic features of conscious experience, intrinsic features of consciousness, nonetheless, manifest themselves in our experience in a liminal way. Overall it proceeds in two movements. Negatively, it argues that implicit self-awareness renders any notion of reflective access methodologically superfluous but existentially irresistible. Positively, it argues that ‘reflective’ access to the liminal dimensions (...) of conscious experience should be construed in purely semantic terms, tied to indirect experiential acquaintance. It concludes by suggesting that what goes by the name mental transparency, even its strong versions, does not rule out liminal manifestation: mental transparency is not mental invisibility. (shrink)

This article explores the ethical concept of neutrality through use of a psychiatric clinical vignette. In this case a psychiatry resident is faced with the treatment of a patient who was found by the FBI to be in possession of child pornography. Although not accused of any other crimes, the patient was a fugitive from the law and requesting treatment for pedophilia. Faced with the pressures of limited resources and anxiety about the patient's dangerousness to others, the resident and his (...) supervisor tried to strike a balance between the ethical principles of neutrality and beneficence. Through this vignette, the importance of neutrality, as well as how it can be compromised by other pressures such as expediency and anxiety, is explored. (shrink)

This article surveys most of the recent reviews of Sarah Richmond’s excellent new translation of L’Être et le néant. It offers some close textual comparisons between Richmond’s translation, Hazel Barnes’ translation, and the Checklist of Errors of Hazel Barnes’ Translation of L’Être et le néant. This article concludes that Richmond delivers a higher semantic resolution translation that overcomes nearly all the liabilities found in Barnes and does so without sacrificing much by way of readability.

We construct computably enumerable degrees a < b such that all computably enumerable degrees c with a < c < b isolate some d. c. e. degree d.

What methodology should philosophers follow? Should they rely on methods that can be conducted from the armchair? Or should they leave the armchair and turn to the methods of the natural sciences, such as experiments in the laboratory? Or is this opposition itself a false one? Arguments about philosophical methodology are raging in the wake of a number of often conflicting currents, such as the growth of experimental philosophy, the resurgence of interest in metaphysical questions, and the use of formal (...) methods. This outstanding collection of specially-commissioned chapters by leading international philosophers discusses these questions and many more. It provides a comprehensive survey of philosophical methodology in the most important philosophical subjects: metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, phenomenology, philosophy of science, ethics, and aesthetics. A key feature of the collection is that philosophers discuss and evaluate contrasting approaches in each subject, offering a superb overview of the variety of methodological approaches - both naturalistic and non-naturalistic - in each of these areas. They examine important topics at the heart of methodological argument, including the role of intuitions and conceptual analysis, thought experiments, introspection, and the place that results from the natural sciences should have in philosophical theorizing. The collection begins with a fascinating exchange about philosophical naturalism between Timothy Williamson and Alexander Rosenberg, and also includes contributions from the following philosophers: Lynne Rudder Baker, Matt Bedke, Greg Currie, Michael Devitt, Matthew C. Haug, Jenann Ismael, Hilary Kornblith, Neil Levy, E.J. Lowe, Kirk Ludwig, Marie McGinn, David Papineau, Matthew Ratcliffe, Georges Rey, Jeffrey W. Roland, Barry C. Smith, Amie L. Thomasson, Valerie Tiberius, Jessica Wilson, and David W. Smith. (shrink)

Fichte develops his idealism through a higher-level critique: only through the Fichtean fact of reason can one justify a systematic transcendental idealism, thereby making possible the self-sufficiency of theoretical reason. By examining the metaphilosophical implications of our immediate consciousness of the moral law, Fichte is able to assert the necessary metaphilosophical primacy of practical reason for any possible wissenschaftlich philosophy as well as the philosophical unity of theory and practice within such a system.

Crespi & Badcock (C&B) convincingly argue that autism and schizophrenia are diametric malfunctions of the social brain, but their core imprinting hypothesis is less persuasive. Much of the evidence they cite is unrelated to their hypothesis, is selective, or is overstated; their hypothesis lacks a clearly explained mechanism; and it is unclear how their explanation fits in with known aspects of the disorders.

Recently Robert Forman has attempted to muster support for the largely abandoned position that mystical experiences cross-culturally include an unmediated, non-relative core. To reopen the debate he has solicited essays from likeminded scholars for his book, The Problem of Pure Consciousness. Predictably the focus of the volume rests on the refutation of the position most notably expounded by Steven Katz in his influential article of 1978, ‘Language, Epistemology and Mysticism’.

In AFTERLIVES OF AFFECT, Watson considers the life and work of Mayanist Linda Schele (1942 - 1988) as an entry point to discuss the nature of cultural inquiry and the metaphor of decipherment in anthropology. Watson figures Schele as a trickster guide in his experimental, person-centered ethnography, reanimating the work of decipherment and drawing upon an "affect of discovery" that better expresses the affective engagement of anthropologists and their subject of study. Through her archive, Watson finds an archaeologist wholly animated (...) by her fieldsite and immersed in a more "spiritual science," though nonetheless still imbricated in a system of settler-colonial knowledge production. By holding Schele's work in conversation with both her own interlocutors and prominent voices in the field today, Watson refocuses on anthropologists who are engaged as individuals; carrying their own attachments with them as they describe, interpret, and decipher what they observe, and in doing so, positions affective engagement as a constitutive element in a more reflexive anthropology. The book is organized into six chapters that progress thematically through Schele's life and Watson's autoethnographic reflections on his own research. In Sacrilege (chapter 1), Watson draws together moments throughout his research where he felt his exhumation of Schele's work veered too closely to disturbing what was laid to rest-much like Schele's own work, which relied on the unearthing of sites long laid to rest, reanimating long-dead Mayan rulers and artists. The chapter sets the tone of the work as always toeing the line and risking the introduction of the mystical and affective into scientific interpretation-edgewalking with Schele. In Animals (chapter 2), Watson draws upon metaphors in the animal world, as did Schele when she sought inspiration for her next moment of insight; spider webs present a Geertzian metaphor for webs of signification, while rabbits are trickster guides, a transtemporalizing technology, drawing Schele (and Watson) forward and back through time. Through these reflections, Watson builds iteratively on arguments throughout the book that return to themes more recognizable in contemporary theory conversations: more-than-human worlds, the question of modernity, and the social conditions of knowledge production. This book will be of interest to readers in anthropology, especially those engaged in the ontological turn and more-than-human worlds, as well as the history of anthropology and anthropology theory more broadly. This book will also be of interest to readers in science studies, the posthumanities, and affect theory. (shrink)

If alleles that predispose to schizophrenia have reduced Darwinian fitness, their persistence in modern times is puzzling. Burns identifies the evolutionary genetics of schizophrenia as a central issue, but his treatment of it is not clear. Recent advances in evolutionary genetics can help explain the persistence of alleles that predispose to debilitating disorders such as schizophrenia, and can buttress Burns' core argument.

: This article argues that conceptions of community after Dewey despair of an institutional means of recovering individuality, which is the central problem of democracy. They so despair, I contend, because of their politicized view of the individual. I first briefly consider the contrast between Dewey and contemporary proceduralists and civic republicans, before turning to my central discussion: C. Wright Mills, whose critique indicates a historical watershed for Dewey's view of community. Ultimately, despair of a Deweyan sense of community issues (...) in a contemporary stalemate between what I identify as the political "activist" and "apathist.". (shrink)

_Kant and Applied Ethics_ makes an important contribution to Kant scholarship, illuminating the vital moral parameters of key ethical debates. Offers a critical analysis of Kant’s ethics, interrogating the theoretical bases of his theory and evaluating their strengths and weaknesses Examines the controversies surrounding the most important ethical discussions taking place today, including abortion, the death penalty, and same-sex marriage Joins innovative thinkers in contemporary Kantian scholarship, including Christine Korsgaard, Allen Wood, and Barbara Herman, in taking Kant’s philosophy in new (...) and interesting directions Clarifies Kant’s legacy for applied ethics, helping us to understand how these debates have been structured historically and providing us with the philosophical tools to address them. (shrink)

When examined critically, Kant's views on sex and marriage give us the tools to defend same-sex marriage on moral grounds. The sexual objectification of one's partner can only be overcome when two people take responsibility for one another's overall well-being, and this commitment is enforced through legal coercion. Kant's views on the unnaturalness of homosexuality do not stand up to scrutiny, and he cannot (as he often tries to) restrict the purpose of sex to procreation. Kant himself rules out marriage (...) only when the partners cannot give themselves to one another equally – that is, if there is inequality of exchange. Because same-sex marriage would be between equals and would allow homosexuals to express their desire in a morally appropriate way, it ought to be legalized. (shrink)

From its inception in Kant's efforts to articulate a "religion within the limits of reason alone," the Continental tradition has maintained a strict division of labor between theological and philosophical reflection on religion. In what follows, I examine this continental legacy in the context of Jacques Derrida's recent work on the concept of responsibility. First I discuss three guiding themes (the limits of speculative analysis, the idea of nondogmatic religion, and the importance of the other) that characterize the continental tradition's (...) general orientation toward philosophy of religion, as well as Derrida's approach to the concept of responsibility. I turn next to elucidating Derrida's account of responsibility as developed in "Force of Law: The Mystical Foundations of Authority" and The Gift of Death. I conclude with a discussion of the uses and limits of this account for religious (and theological) reflection, as well as for the task of articulating a contemporary continental philosophy of religion. (shrink)

Drosophila imaginal discs (appendage primordia) have proved invaluable for deciphering cellular and molecular mechanisms of animal development. By combining the accessibility of the discs with the genetic tractability of the fruit fly, researchers have discovered key mechanisms of growth control, pattern formation and long‐range signaling. One of the principal experimental attractions of discs is their anatomical simplicity — they have long been considered to be cellular monolayers. During larval stages, however, the growing discs are 2‐sided sacs composed of a columnar (...) epithelium on one side and a squamous ‘peripodial’ epithelium on the other. Recent studies suggest important roles for peripodial epithelia in processes previously assumed to be confined to columnar cell monolayers. BioEssays 23:691–697, 2001. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (shrink)

Mutagenesis makes it possible to examine the effect of amino acid replacements on the folding and stability of proteins. The evaluation of kinetic and equilibrium folding data using reaction coordinate diagrams allows one to determine the roles that single amino acids play in the folding mechanism.

When consumers choose to abstain from purchasing meat, they face some uncertainty about whether their decisions will have an impact on the number of animals raised and killed. Consequentialists have argued that this uncertainty should not dissuade consumers from a vegetarian diet because the “expected” impact, or average impact, will be predictable. Recently, however, critics have argued that the expected marginal impact of a consumer change is likely to be much smaller or more radically unpredictable than previously thought. This objection (...) to the consequentialist case for vegetarianism is known as the “causal inefficacy” (or “causal impotence”) objection. In this paper, we argue that the inefficacy objection fails. First, we summarize the contours of the objection and the standard “expected impact” response to it. Second, we examine and rebut two contemporary attempts (by Mark Budolfson and Ted Warfield) to defeat the expected impact reply through alleged demonstrations of the inefficacy of abstaining from meat consumption. Third, we argue that there are good reasons to believe that single individual consumers—not just individual consumers taken as an aggregate—really do make a positive difference when they choose to abstain from meat consumption. Our case rests on three economic observations: (i) animal producers operate in a highly competitive environment, (ii) complex supply chains efficiently communicate some information about product demand, and (iii) consumers of plant-based meat alternatives have positive consumption spillover effects on other consumers. (shrink)

Influences on social traits involve a tangled interplay of genetic, social, and environmental factors. Moreover, there is increasing awareness that gene–environment correlations are real and potentially measurable. Such gene–environment correlations can mislead if they are uncontrolled and genetic associations are interpreted as being purely because of direct genetic effects. This complexity is cause for more and better investigation, not a reason to refrain from researching one of the potentially important factors (genetics) influencing trait variation.

"This book argues for a mixed view of punishment that balances consequentialism and retributivism. He has published extensively on philosophy and applied ethics. A central question in the philosophy of law is why the state's punishment of its own citizens is justified. Traditionally, two theories of punishment have dominated the field: consequentialism and retributivism. According to consequentialism, punishment is justified when it maximizes positive outcomes. According to retributivism, criminals should be punished because they deserve it. This book defends a mixed (...) view that recognizes the strength of both of these intuitions. By this account, the legislature should develop institutional policies and statutory penalties that maintain the social order, that is, consequentialism. It establishes punishment policies to deter criminal activity. By contrast, the criminal judiciary should give individual defendants what they deserve, that is, retributivism and thus expressing the community's appropriate sense of resentment at being wronged. The book justifies the two-tiered model by showing how it accords with our moral intuitions, our assumptions about how what we know affects our moral obligations, and a commonly held theory of freedom. This approach is developed by engaging classic and contemporary work in the philosophy of law, and shows its advantages over competing approaches from contemporary retributivists and other mixed theorists. The work also defends consequentialism against a longstanding objection that the social sciences give us little guidance regarding which policies to adopt. It draws on cutting-edge criminological research to show how punishment theory can help us to address some of our most pressing social issues, including the death penalty, drug laws, and mass incarceration. The book will also be of interest to legal philosophers, social scientists, especially criminologists, sociologists, economists, and political scientists"--. (shrink)

"The greatest crisis of our times in a failure of the human imagination." -Editors The world is currently undergoing a period of unprecedented crises on virtually every front: economic, ecological, and humanitarian. It is starkly apparent that a shift is needed in our dominant structural systems - and that by addressing the collective thinking that has created and maintained these systems, scholars can do their part to catalyze such a shift. The interdisciplinary field known as the Anthropology of Consciousness offers (...) important insights for enacting this necessary shift. This book draws on the work of a group of diverse scholars to explore what the intersection of anthropology and consciousness studies can contribute to the "public turn" within anthropology and the academy in general. Its twelve chapters span disparate geographies and disciplinary frameworks, yet cohere in their focus on common themes such as imagination, empathy, agency, dialogue, and ethics. The answers to the question "So What? Now What?" differ for a linguistic anthropologist in the South Pacific, an environmental educator in Hawai'i, a grant-writing anthropologist serving a refugee agency in Portland, Oregon and the founder of a girls' school in Brazil. Nevertheless, they are united in the desire to reframe the anthropology of consciousness as an "anthropology of conscience," and this pioneering volume is the result. (shrink)

Given that natural selection is so powerful at optimizing complex adaptations, why does it seem unable to eliminate genes (susceptibility alleles) that predispose to common, harmful, heritable mental disorders, such as schizophrenia or bipolar disorder? We assess three leading explanations for this apparent paradox from evolutionary genetic theory: (1) ancestral neutrality (susceptibility alleles were not harmful among ancestors), (2) balancing selection (susceptibility alleles sometimes increased fitness), and (3) polygenic mutation-selection balance (mental disorders reflect the inevitable mutational load on the thousands (...) of genes underlying human behavior). The first two explanations are commonly assumed in psychiatric genetics and Darwinian psychiatry, while mutation-selection has often been discounted. All three models can explain persistent genetic variance in some traits under some conditions, but the first two have serious problems in explaining human mental disorders. Ancestral neutrality fails to explain low mental disorder frequencies and requires implausibly small selection coefficients against mental disorders given the data on the reproductive costs and impairment of mental disorders. Balancing selection (including spatio-temporal variation in selection, heterozygote advantage, antagonistic pleiotropy, and frequency-dependent selection) tends to favor environmentally contingent adaptations (which would show no heritability) or high-frequency alleles (which psychiatric genetics would have already found). Only polygenic mutation-selection balance seems consistent with the data on mental disorder prevalence rates, fitness costs, the likely rarity of susceptibility alleles, and the increased risks of mental disorders with brain trauma, inbreeding, and paternal age. This evolutionary genetic framework for mental disorders has wide-ranging implications for psychology, psychiatry, behavior genetics, molecular genetics, and evolutionary approaches to studying human behavior. (Published Online November 9 2006) Key Words: adaptation; behavior genetics; Darwinian psychiatry; evolution; evolutionary genetics; evolutionary psychology; mental disorders; mutation-selection balance; psychiatric genetics; quantitative trait loci (QTL). (shrink)

Most ethics guidelines for distributing scarce medical resources during the coronavirus pandemic seek to save the most lives and the most life‐years. A patient’s prognosis is determined using a SOFA or MSOFA score to measure likelihood of survival to discharge, as well as a consideration of relevant comorbidities and their effects on likelihood of survival up to one or five years. Although some guidelines use age as a tiebreaker when two patients’ prognoses are identical, others refuse to consider age for (...) fear of discriminating against the elderly. In this paper, I argue that age is directly relevant for maximizing health benefits, so current ethics guidelines are wrongly excluding or deemphasizing life‐stage in their triage algorithms. Research on COVID‐19 has shown that age is a risk factor in adverse outcomes, independent of comorbidities. And limiting a consideration of life‐years to only one or five years past discharge does not maximize health benefits. Therefore, based on their own stated values, triage algorithms for coronavirus patients ought to include life‐stage as a primary consideration, along with the SOFA score and comorbidities, rather than excluding it or using it merely as a tiebreaker. This is not discriminatory because patients ought to have equal opportunity to experience life‐stages. The equitable enforcement of that right justifies unequal treatment based on age in cases when there is a scarcity of life‐saving resources. A consideration of life‐stage would thus allow healthcare workers to responsibly steward public resources in order to maximize lives and life‐years saved. (shrink)

During the coronavirus pandemic, communities have faced shortages of important healthcare resources such as COVID-19 vaccines, medical staff, ICU beds and ventilators. Public health officials in the U.S. have had to make decisions about two major issues: which infected patients should be treated first, and which people who are at risk of infection should be inoculated first. Following Beauchamp and Childress’s principlism, adopted guidelines have tended to value both whole lives and life-years. This process of collective moral reasoning has revealed (...) our common commitment to both Kantian and utilitarian principles. For Kant, respecting people’s rights entails that we ought to value whole lives equally. Therefore we ought to allocate resources so as to maximise the number of patients who survive to discharge. By contrast, the principle of utility has us maximise life-years so that people can satisfy more of their considered preferences. Although people are treated impartially in the utilitarian calculus, it does not recognise their equal worth. Subjecting Kantian ethics and utilitarianism to the process of reflective equilibrium lends support to the idea that we need a pluralistic approach that would accommodate our moral intuitions regarding both the equal value of whole lives and the additive value of life-years. (shrink)

Two of the major arguments against performance-enhancing drugs (PEDs), appealing to fairness and the protection of athletes’ health, have serious flaws. First, there is no relevant moral distinction between the use of PEDs and the use of other performance enhancers that introduce unfairness and that we accept nonetheless. Second, prohibiting PEDs for athletes’ own good ignores the fact that adult athletes are constantly making tradeoffs to improve performance and pursue excellence, including sacrificing their health. We should not paternalistically impose our (...) values on them. On the other side, arguments to allow ‘safe’ PEDs provide no normative criterion to determine the acceptable level of risk, thus begging the question. The reasonable athlete argument solves both sets of problems: it justifies a ban on some performance-enhancing drugs based on health and fairness, while avoiding paternalism, and it also establishes a non-arbitrary standard to determine which drugs ought to be allowed. First, if unsafe PEDs were allowed, some athletes would refuse to take them out of concern for their health. This is a reasonable decision even though it would put them at a competitive disadvantage against athletes who choose to use unsafe PEDs. It would be unfair for clean athletes to suffer a competitive disadvantage for acting reasonably. Therefore, PEDs that pose significant health risks should be prohibited for all athletes. Second, it would be unreasonable for athletes to refuse, on principle, relatively safe and effective PEDs, so a blanket prohibition is also unjustified. Which drugs and which doses to allow should be determined not by athletes’ actual choices but by the hypothetical choices of the reasonable athlete. The resulting sport-specific drug policy would carve a justifiable middle path between complete prohibition and complete permission. (shrink)

When consumers choose to abstain from purchasing meat, they face some uncertainty about whether their decisions will have an impact on the number of animals raised and killed. Consequentialists have argued that this uncertainty should not dissuade consumers from a vegetarian diet because the “expected” impact, or average impact, will be predictable. Recently, however, critics have argued that the expected marginal impact of a consumer change is likely to be much smaller or more radically unpredictable than previously thought. This objection (...) to the consequentialist case for vegetarianism is known as the “causal inefficacy” (or “causal impotence”) objection. In this paper, we argue that the inefficacy objection fails. First, we summarize the contours of the objection and the standard “expected impact” response to it. Second, we examine and rebut two contemporary attempts (by Mark Budolfson and Ted Warfield) to defeat the expected impact reply through alleged demonstrations of the inefficacy of abstaining from meat consumption. Third, we argue that there are good reasons to believe that single individual consumers—not just consumers in aggregate—really do make a positive difference when they choose to abstain from meat consumption. Our case rests on three economic observations: (i) animal producers operate in a highly competitive environment, (ii) complex supply chains efficiently communicate some information about product demand, and (iii) consumers of plant-based meat alternatives have positive consumption spillover effects on other consumers. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Physician‐Assisted Suicide Refusing Life‐Saving Medical Treatment Organ Donation: Opt‐in or Opt‐out? Autonomy and the Body.

Kant is gaining popularity in business ethics because the categorical imperative rules out actions such as deceptive advertising and exploitative working conditions, both of which treat people merely as means to an end. However, those who apply Kant in this way often hold businesses themselves morally accountable, and this conception of collective responsibility contradicts the kind of moral agency that underlies Kant's ethics. A business has neither inclinations nor the capacity to reason, so it lacks the conditions necessary for constraint (...) by the moral law. Instead, corporate policies ought to be understood as analogous to legal constraints. They may encourage or discourage certain actions, but they cannot determine a person's maxim - which for Kant is the focus of moral judgment. Because there is no collective intention apart from any intentions of the individual agents who act as members of the corporation, an organization itself has no moral obligations. This poses a dilemma: either apply the categorical imperative to the actions of particular businesspeople and surrender the notion of collective responsibility, or apply a different moral theory to the actions of businesses themselves. Given the diffusion of responsibility in a bureaucracy, the explanatory usefulness of collective responsibility may force business ethicists to abandon Kant's moral philosophy. (shrink)